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The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-an
independent agency tasked with ensuring 'just and reasona-
ble" energy rates-has begun to use energy market payment
systems to prop upfossilfuels. FERC has issued orders that
prevent renewables from competing with fossilfuels by forcing
renewables to bid into energy markets at artificially high
rates. FERC has argued that state clean energy subsidies
distort energy markets by "suppressing prices" and pushing
"needed" fossilfuel generators out of the market. According to
FERC, a federal intervention is necessary to protect "market
integrity" and ensure that consumers can access reliable
electricity.
This Note argues that FERC's interventions are neither
necessary nor legal FERC, it seems, is simply intent on
counteracting state clean energy policies. This Note shows
that FERC's orders lack any theoretical justification because
the markets FERC has developed would retain adequate n-
ergy generators to provide reliable electricity without FERC
bailing out fossil fuels. In addition, this Note shows FERC's
antirenewables interventions are arbitrary and capricious in
violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. FERC gave an
implausible explanation for its order because it claims it is
trying to resolve the issue of unjust and unreasonable rates,
but its decision exacerbates that problem. FERC's order
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makes consumers pay more for electricity unnecessarily.
FERC also failed to consider critical aspects of the problem,
including (1) reasonable alternatives that did not involve price
inflation and (2) the existence of subsidies supporting fossil
fuels.
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INTRODUCTION
In an order on Friday, June 29, 2018, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)1 made the bold claim that the
"integrity and effectiveness" of a major energy2 market "have
become untenably threatened."3 The "threat"? State renewa-
ble subsidies. Essentially, FERC was arguing that these subsi-
1 FERC is an independent government agency that seeks to "[assist con-
sumers in obtaining economically efficient, safe, reliable, and secure energy ser-
vices at a reasonable cost through appropriate regulatory and market means, and
collaborative efforts." About FERC, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/about/about.
asp?csrt=13345041080330469569 [https://perma.cc/4S2B-ZKN3]. For back-
ground on FERC, see infra subpart I.A.
2 For simplicity's sake, this Note, like most legal and economic discourse on
the subject, uses the terms energy and electricity interchangeably. It recognizes,
however, that the terms have distinct scientific definitions: energy is the "ability to
do work," while electricity is the "movement of charged particles through a wire or
other medium." Anne Marie Helmenstine, How Does Electrical Energy Work?,
THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/electrical-energy-definition-and-ex-
amples-4119325 [https://perma.cc/4ZIJ-9BYK (last updated June 8, 2019).
3 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC 1 61236, at *3
(June 29, 2018).
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dies have made renewable energy sources4 too cheap too fast in
the capacity market5 managed by PJM Interconnection, LLC
(PJM).6 In response, FERC forced PJM to adopt a minimum
offer price rule (MOPR) that would apply to renewable energy
generators7 receiving state subsidies." The MOPR requires
these generators to bid into capacity markets at a high rate.9
This ensures that renewables do not underbid fossil fuel10 gen-
erators, and it will effectively exclude renewables from markets
that provide almost thirty percent of all generator revenue.11
4 Renewable energy sources are energy sources that "can be utilized [to
produce electricity] without any discernable reduction in their future availability."
EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 733 (4th ed. 2015). For
example, solar energy (energy generated by the sun) is renewable because no
matter how much of the sun's energy humans use, the sun will keep generating
more energy that will be available for future use. Id. at 733-34. Other examples
of renewable energy sources include wind power, hydropower, deepwater energy,
biomass, and geothermal energy. Id. at 728. Unlike fossil fuels, most renewable
resources-including solar energy, wind power, hydropower, deepwater energy,
and geothermal energy-do not emit carbon dioxide while producing electricity.
Id. at 732-46; Dan Kasper, Renewable and Non-Renewable Energy, PENN STATE
COLLEGE OF EARTH & MINERAL SCIENCES: JOHN A. DUTTON E-EDUCATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/emsc240/node/506 [https://perma.ce/
MQB6-8EE9. Because of this, their usage does not contribute to climate change
like the usage of fossil fuels. Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, UNION CONCERNED
Sci. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ucsuse.org/resources/benefits-renewable-en-
ergy-use [https://perma.cc/N85Q-6FEB].
5 In capacity markets, energy generators sell the commitment to provide
electricity on-demand in the future. See infra subpart I.B.
6 PJM "operates the world's largest wholesale electricity market as the re-
gional transmission organization for the area that encompasses all or parts of
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District
of Columbia." Statistics at a Glance Fact Sheet, PJM (Mar. 16, 2017), https://
learn.pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/pjms-markets-fact-
sheet.ashx [https://perma.cc/KMN4-B2VGI. Regional transmissions organiza-
tions are nonprofit entities that, inter alia, run energy auctions. See infra subpart
I.A. for a more detailed discussion of what regional transmissions organizations
do.
7 Generators produce electricity. See Electric Generator, OPENEI, https://
openel.org/wiki/Definition:Electricgenerator#citenote-I [https://perma.ce/
EVR2-M6QJI.
8 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC 1 61236, at *2
(June 29, 2018).
9 Id.
10 Fossil fuels are fuel sources "formed from organic material over the course
of millions of years," including coal, oil, and natural gas. Fossil Fuels, ENVTL. &
ENERGY STUDY INST., https://www.eesi.org/topics/fossil-fuels/description [https:/
/perma.cc/HVY4-EKCN]. Fossil fuels release greenhouse gases including carbon
dioxide. Id.
11 See, e.g., JOE BOWRING, 2017 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT 42, 45, 55 (2018),
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/20180322
-state-of-market-report-review/20 180322-2017-state-of-the-market-report-re
view.ashx [https://perma.cc/T8XR-Q7HC] (showing generator revenues provided
by PJM's capacity market). PJM's capacity market is the nation's largest market
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While FERC argues that it needs to prop up uneconomic fossil
fuell 2 plants to make capacity markets function effectively, the
very purpose of applying market-based principles to the elec-
tricity grid was to allow economically efficient plants to drive
out costly plants.1 3 By requiring Americans to pay a more ex-
pensive price for electricity unnecessarily and without a good
explanation, FERC is acting arbitrarily and capriciously.
After providing background on FERC and capacity mar-
kets, this Note will compile and tabulate all the "justifications"
FERC has ever given to support its decisions to require or ap-
prove of MOPRs in capacity markets. It not only analyzes
FERC's reasoning in its recent order requiring a MOPR for
renewables but also documents how FERC explained previous
MOPRs that applied to gas-fired power plants. It turns out that
FERC has offered no real justification for developing any of
these MOPRs. FERC has simply stated that MOPRs are neces-
sary to prevent "price suppression."14 Without explaining fur-
ther, it suggests that price suppression pushes "economic"
resources off the market and impairs the energy grid's'5 ability
to provide reliable electricity.
In Part II, subpart A, this Note will explain why FERC's so-
called justification for its MOPRs is incoherent. While FERC
argues that traditional generators are "economic," it has failed
to establish that renewables are actually less economically
competitive than fossil fuel generators, which also receive sig-
nificant subsidies. Moreover, this Note shows that FERC's
statements that MOPRs are necessary for reliability are incor-
for grid capacity. Jeff St. John, Prices Spike in PJM Capacity Auction, GREEN TECH
MEDIA (May 23, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/prices-
spike-in-pjm-capacity-auction [https://perma.cc/ZP9V-ZRRN]. In 2016, PJM's
capacity market had an average installed generating capacity of 162,571 mega-
watts (MW). Joseph E. Bowring, The Evolution of PJM's Capacity Market, in COM-
PETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, PERFORMANCE 363, 365
(Fereidoon P. Sioshansi ed., 2008).
12 See supra note 10.
13 See Electric Competition, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric
/indus-act/competition.asp [https://perma.cc/A4P2-NZY7] (noting that "[tihe
Commission's core responsibility is to 'guard the consumer from exploitation by
non-competitive electric power companies"' as part of a discussion on the Com-
mission's efforts to enforce a national policy of fostering competition); cf. EISEN ET
AL., supra note 4 (describing the expectations of the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) that increasing competition in electric generation would re-
sult in drops of retail prices, benefiting consumers).
14 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC 91 61236 at *46
(June 29, 2018).
15 The energy grid is "an interconnected network for delivering electricity from




rect. In a capacity market, price suppression cannot displace
necessary generators. This is because capacity markets, by
definition, operate to compensate every generator needed to
provide enough electricity to ensure reliability.16 FERC ap-
proves determinations of how much electricity this is, so if
FERC is worried about blackouts, it can simply require that
capacity markets secure more electricity. The only possible
defense of FERC's actions is that it wants to counteract state
efforts to encourage the growth of renewables by giving favored
electricity sources extra compensation.
In Part II, subpart B, this Note will argue that FERC's logic
is legally unsound under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). First, FERC gave an implausible explanation for its or-
der because it claims it is trying to resolve the issue of unjust
and unreasonable rates, but its decision exacerbates that prob-
lem. Second, FERC failed to consider important aspects of the
problem it faced because it did not examine (1) reasonable
alternatives that do not inflate prices and (2) the many subsi-
dies supporting traditional resources.
As Part II, subpart C, will describe, while this may seem
like a technical question about the arcane recesses of energy
markets, my argument has significant implications on the
United States' ability to integrate higher volumes of renew-
ables. If FERC is correct and electricity markets cannot cur-
rently accommodate higher volumes of renewables, then
environmentalists need to think about how to restructure elec-
tricity markets in order to ensure that renewables can provide
a large percentage of American electricity. If, however, FERC is
simply giving a handout to favored fossil fuel generators, as I
will argue, then this Note will defend the current market struc-
ture against academics who have argued that a broader regula-
tory intervention is necessary to ensure that renewables can
provide a greater share of American electricity. 17
16 "Reliability means fulfilling basic consumer demand for electricity, while
being flexible enough to increase output during predicted peaks." Energy Chal-
lenges: Reliability, EDF ENERGY, https://www.edfenergy.com/future-energy/
challenges/reliability [https://perma.cc/TC42-QSK8]. Part of reliability is re-
source adequacy-meaning that there are always enough energy resources availa-
ble to meet consumer demand. Charlie Black, Deep Dive: What Is Resource
Adequacy?, NORTHWEST CLEAN ENERGY (Mar. 10, 2016), https://northwestclean
energy.com/2016/03/10/deep-dive-what-is-resource-adequacy/ [https://
perma.cc/2G9L-DLHN].
17 See, e.g., William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Ftuture, 61 UCLA





Subpart A provides a brief history of FERC's regulation of
the electricity grid. Because today's energy markets are a prod-
uct of FERC's restructuring of the previously uncompetitive
electricity industry, this history is important to understanding
these somewhat convoluted markets. This Part documents
how and why FERC started to promote competition, including
how FERC encouraged the development of independent system
operators (ISOs)18 and regional transmissions organizations
(RTOs) 19 like PJM to manage competitive markets. This histor-
ical background sheds light on what role entities like PJM play
and what relationship FERC has with these entities. Further,
it sets the stage for the argument that FERC's MOPR require-
ment cuts against the very purpose of competitive energy mar-
kets, as articulated by FERC itself. By describing the concerns
FERC focused on when restructuring the electricity industry,
this Part also illuminates what traits of the energy grid-partic-
ularly, reliability and low costs for consumers-FERC views as
indicators of "just and reasonable"20 rates. This is important to
18 See text accompanying infra note 47.
19 See text accompanying infra notes 48-49.
20 Environmental Defense Fund attorney Michael Panfil defines just and rea-
sonable for lay readers as "as affordable as possible while maintaining reliability."
Michael Panifil, What Will FERC Do in Wake of Increasingly Affordable Electricity
Prices?, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND (June 22, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/energyex-
change/2017/06/22/what-will-ferc-do-in-wake-of-increasingly-affordable-elec-
tricity-prices/ [https://perma.cc/RTB4-A467]. Neither Congress nor courts have
provided a precise, generally applicable definition of just and reasonable, but
Panfil's definition aligns with how FERC has historically justified its decisions, as
subpart A will illuminate. See Steve N. Isser, Just and Reasonable: The Corner-
stone of Energy Regulation 5-6, 38-39 (Energy Law & Econ. Working Paper 2015-
1, June 30, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2625131 [https://perma.cc/
2RS3-CSKQ] (noting that the FPA does not define just and reasonable, the FPA's
legislative history does not shed light on the phrase's meaning, and different
Supreme Courts have interpreted the phrase differently and given FERC consider-
able discretion in applying it); Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist.
No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008) ("The statutory requirement that rates be just
and reasonable' is obviously incapable of precise judicial definition, and we afford
great deference to the Commission in its rate decisions."); see also infra Analysis
subpart II.A; cf. Bruce Campbell, Energy Policy 101, CPOWER KNOWLEDGE (Dec. 12,
2016), https://cpowerenergymanagement.com/energy-policy-101-movement-
electrons-regulated/ [https://perma.cc/HM58-XNXR] ("While ostensibly the 'just
and reasonable' standard may include cost considerations, FERC, like PJM and
other RTOs, also has a bias toward reliability and often will accept the RTO filing
regardless of cost implications."); LAWRENCE R. GREENFIELD, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILI-
TIES 28, 34, 40 (May 2017), https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does/ferclOl.pdf
fhttps://perma.cc/TA55-DPZ51 (ambiguously defining just and reasonable as
"cost-justified" and "market-justified"). Whether FERC should consider reliability
232 [Vol. 105:227
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understanding FERC's justifications-or lack thereof-for its
MOPRs.
Subpart B describes how ISOs and RTOs created capacity
markets to address reliability concerns. Through its descrip-
tion of how capacity markets work, it provides background for
the argument that capacity markets ensure reliability-without
FERC intervening and establishing MOPRs.
Subpart C describes how "price suppression" can occur in
capacity markets and how FERC has attempted to combat
price suppression by ordering ISOs and RTOs to establish
MOPRs. It demonstrates how FERC views price suppression as
an economic efficiency and reliability problem yet has never
truly justified this viewpoint. Lastly, it tabulates every MOPR
that FERC has ever approved of or demanded an ISO or RTO to
implement, as well as FERC's "justification" for each MOPR.
A. History of FERC's Regulation of the Electricity Grid
Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) gives FERC2 1
responsibility for ensuring, inter alia, that "[all rates and
charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for
or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission22 . . . [are] just
and reasonable."23 Section 206 of the FPA empowers FERC to,
inter alia, initiate proceedings to correct any such "rate, charge,
or classification . .. or rule, regulation, practice, or contract
affecting such rate, charge, or classification [that it finds] un-
just tor] unreasonable."24 This statutory mandate has not
concerns in evaluating whether rates are just and reasonable is a different ques-
tion, and some argue that it should not. See generally Constellation Mystic
Power, LLC, 165 FERC 91 61267 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting) (arguing against
FERC's use of its ratemaking authority to address fuel security concerns); Joshua
C. Macey, Rate Regulation Redux (forthcoming) (on file with author). However, for
the purposes of this Note, we will assume that FERC has correctly interpreted the
meaning of just and reasonable in its statutory mandate and ask whether, even
so, FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its MOPR decisions.
21 The FPA, passed in 1935, originally vested this responsibility in the Federal
Power Commission (FPC), FERC's predecessor. In 1977, Congress restructured
the FPC into FERC. History of FERC, FERC: STUDENTS CORNER, https://
www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp [https://perma.cc/MYM6-C2JW].
22 FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale rates, while states have jurisdiction
over retail rates. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012) (describing the FPA's applicability to
"the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" but not to "any
other sale of electric energy"); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760
(2016) ("But the law places beyond FERC's power, and leaves to the States alone,
the regulation of 'any other sale'-most notably, any retail sale-of electricity."). A
wholesale sale is a sale for resale. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).
23 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
24 Id. § 824e(a).
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changed since Congress passed the FPA in 1935; it has always
vested in FERC a duty to protect consumers from energy com-
panies overcharging for their services.2 5 However, the agency's
understanding of what exactly a "Just and reasonable" rate
entails has evolved over time as FERC has begun to consider
new, interconnected goals such as increasing competition and
reliability.26
In the wake of the FPA's passage, public utilities2 7 owned
all the electricity generation,2 8 transmission,2 9 and distribu-
tion3 o services in their respective service areas-essentially,
utilities had regional energy monopolies.3 1 FERC's predeces-
sor, the FPC,32 and later FERC itself, prevented utilities from
25 About FERC, supra note 1; Lynn Hargis, The Federal Power Act, CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/federal-power actfactsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35CU-P5KH] ("The Federal Power Act [was] passed to protect
consumers from excessive wholesale electricity rates.").
26 See Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC T
61,285, at *18 (1999) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No.
2000] ("The transition to new market structures has resulted in new challenges
and circumstances.").
27 A public utility is "[any organization which provides services to the general
public, although it may be privately owned." Public Utility, WEx LEGAL DICTIONARY,
https://www.law.comell.edu/wex/public-utility [https://perma.cc/86T-7ZB5]
(also noting that "[plublic utilities are allowed certain monopoly rights because of
the practical need to service entire geographic areas with one system, but they are
regulated").
28 FERC defines generation as "[tihe act of producing electrical energy from
other forms of energy (such as thermal, mechanical, chemical or nuclear)." Gener-
ation, FERC GLOSSARY, https://www.fere.gov/resources/glossary.asp [https://
perma.cc/382R-VG9H] (last updated Mar. 15, 2016).
29 FERC defines transmission as "[mioving bulk energy products from where
they are produced or generated to distribution lines that carry the energy prod-
ucts to consumers." Transmission, FERC GLOSSARY, https://www.ferc.gov/re-
sources/glossary.asp [https://perma.cc/382R-VG9H] (last updated Mar. 15,
2016).
30 FERC defines electric distribution as "the act of distributing electric power
using low voltage transmission lines that deliver power to retail customers." Dis-
tribution, FERC GLOSSARY, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/glossary.asp [https:/
/perma.cc/382R-VG9H] (last updated Mar. 15, 2016).
31 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 458. During this time period, regulators
viewed electricity generation, transmission, and distribution as natural monopo-
lies, meaning that they thought it was most efficient for each geographical market
to have only one vertically integrated utility providing all these services. See id.
Because, in any given region, the same utility would build and operate generation
and transmission, the utility would simply transmit the electricity produced by its
own generators instead of purchasing energy from other energy generators. Id.
Due to this absence of competition, FERC regulated the prices utilities could
charge, establishing rates based on the actual costs incurred by the utilities in
providing service through a process called cost-of-service regulation. New York v.
FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002); Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of
Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419, 422 (1995).
32 See supra note 20.
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using their monopoly power to charge inflated electricity prices
by requiring them to charge just and reasonable rates deter-
mined by the Commission in ratemaking proceedings.3 3
FERC3 4 calculated just and reasonable rates for these utilities
by determining what price would cover the actual costs a utility
incurred in providing services and allow the utility to earn a
reasonable profit.3 5
However, starting in the late 1970s, Congress and FERC
started to restructure the electric utility industry.3 6 Through
both its implementation of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 197837 and its own initiatives, FERC paved the way for
new generators to compete with utilities.38 FERC increasingly
viewed competition as a means of producing just and reasona-
ble rates because it can ensure that consumers pay low costs
without sacrificing reliability, pushing out unneeded, uneco-
nomic generators.3 9 FERC started allowing certain generators
33 This system is called cost-of-service regulation. See EISEN ET AL., supra
note 4, at 455-500; Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New
Proceedings, and Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC 91 61,012, at *4
(2018).
34 State public utilities have also played this role.
35 This calculation did not take into consideration market forces such as
supply and demand.
36 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 626-27, 630; Electric Competition, supra
note 13; Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding,
and Establishing Additional Procedures (Jan. 8, 2018), at 3, https://www.ferc.
gov/CalendarFiles/20180108161614-RM 18- 1-000.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQZ3-
RAUR].
37 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-45.
38 In 1978, Congress enacted the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act,
which facilitated competition by requiring utilities to buy or sell electricity from
cogenerators or small power producers seeking to enter the market, as long as
doing so is economically feasible for the utilities. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3; see also
Cudahy, supra note 31, at 422 (noting that "the statute contained measures that
encouraged cogeneration and facilitated the entry of renewable energy sources
into the market"); EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 631. FERC defines a cogenerator
as "[a] generating facility that produces electricity and another form of useful
thermal energy (such as heat or steam), that is used for industrial, commercial,
heating, or cooling purposes." Cogenerator. FERc GLOSSARY, https://
www.ferc.gov/resources/glossary.asp [https://perma.ce/382R-VG9H] (last up-
dated Mar. 15, 2016). A small power producer is a renewable energy facility with a
small generation capacity. Cudahy, supra note 31, at 422; see also EISEN ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 631. As mbre new generators without monopoly power entered
the market, FERC began to consider basing rates on market forces instead of a
price determined by regulators based on cost of service. EISEN ET AL., supra note 4,
at 633.
39 See Order No. 2000, supra note 26, at *3 (noting that "[clompetition in
wholesale electricity markets is the best way to protect the public interest and
ensure that electricity customers pay the least price possible for reliable service"
in an order promoting competitive market structures pursuant to FERC's Section
205 authority to ensure just and reasonable rates, inter alia); Elizabethtown Gas
Co. v. FERC, 10 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[W]e have indicated that when
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without market power40 to negotiate their own rates with pur-
chasers and presumed that the negotiated rates were just and
reasonable.41
However, these generators faced an obstacle to transmit-
ting their electricity-transmission lines were still controlled by
public utilities that owned their own competing generation fa-
cilities-so Congress increased FERC's jurisdiction over trans-
mission through the federal Energy Policy Act of 1992.42 With
its expanded authority, FERC issued Order No. 888, requiring
public utilities to offer competing generators the same access to
their transmission services that they afford their own genera-
tors.4 3 Under Order No. 888, each utility must file an "open
there is a competitive market the FERC may rely upon market-based prices in lieu
of cost-of-service regulation to assure a just and reasonable' result."); Tejas Power
Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("In a competitive market,
where neither buyer nor seller has significant market power, it is rational to
assume that the terms of their voluntary exchange are reasonable, and specifi-
cally to infer that the price is close to marginal cost, such that the seller makes
only a normal return on its investment"); Electric Competition, supra note 13
(describing competition as FERC's current primary approach to its "core responsi-
bility" of "guard[ingl the customer from exploitation by non-competitive electric
power companies"); EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 630 (describing how FERC
embraced competition "as a way to improve economic efficiency"); cf. 16 U.S.C.
§ 2601 (describing the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act as "a program to
improve . . . the reliability of electric service," inter alia).
40 Market power is "the ability of a firm to set prices above competitive rates."
EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 507.
41 See Dartmouth Power Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 53 FERC 'I 61,117 (1990); EISEN
ET AL., supra note 4, at 507. These negotiated rates are called market-based rates.
EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 507. To obtain authorization to charge market-based
rates, a utility must submit a filing to FERC under Section 205 of the FPA demon-
strating that the utility does not have market power. What Do I Include in My
Application? What Requirements Apply?, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/indus-
tries/electric/gen-info/mbr/filings/initial-applications/what-to-include.asp
[https://perma.cc/TVK7-HJKQ] (last updated Nov. 15, 2017). Utilities charging
market-based rates do not have to undergo ratemaking proceedings.
42 See Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996), App. G, https://www.ferc
.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-8-Oad.txt [https://perma.cc/RVE4-
D5671 (containing FERC's analysis concluding that the Act gave it jurisdiction
over "the rates, terms and conditions of the unbundled transmission in interstate
commerce, by a public utility, of electric energy to an end user"). Following EPAct
1992, FERC used this authority in multiple decisions. See, e.g., Fla. Mun. Power
Agency, 65 FERC 1 61,125 (1993) (ruling on transmission service agreements).
43 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 642; see generally Order No. 888, supra
note 42 (requiring public utilities to offer competing generators the same access to
their transmission services that they afford their own generators).
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access4 4 transmission tariff"4 5 that FERC can approve or deny,
and this tariff must contain the minimum terms and condi-
tions of the utility's transmission service, including the trans-
mission rates.4 6
In Order No. 888, FERC not only required utilities to give
competitors access to their transmission lines but also man-
dated "functional unbundling"-essentially requiring a degree
of separation between a utility's generation and transmission
services.4 7  FERC suggested that groups of utilities achieve
functional unbundling by forming nonprofit, third-party re-
gional entities called Independent System Operators (ISOs) to
manage their transmission lines.4 8 ISOs-and Regional Trans-
missions Organizations (RTOs) 49 which are essentially
equivalent organizations meeting updated standards FERC
promulgated in Order No. 20005 0-make decisions about what
generators can use transmission lines at what times by manag-
44 In general, open access "refers to FERC fostering competition and trans-
parency." Open Access Podcast Description, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, https://
itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/open-access/id1202943507?mt=2 [https://
perma.cc/JBC7-2X4W] (downloaded using iTunes).
45 Here, tariff means "a statement of (1) electric service . . . offered on a
generally applicable basis, (2) rates and charges for or in connection with that
service, and (3) all classifications, practices, rules, or regulations which in any
manner affect or relate to the aforementioned service, rates, and charges." 18
C.F.R. § 35.2(c)(1) (2018).
46 EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 650; Order No. 888, supra note 42, at 777.
Order No. 888 provided utilities with a pro forma open access transmission tariff
(OATT) containing the non-price terms and conditions that OATrs should include,
and later orders amended the pro foria OATT. Open Access Transmission Tariff
(OATT) Reform, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/oatt-
reform.asp [https://perma.cc/A6TN-BJ7H] (last updated Sept. 25, 2018); see
generally Pro Forma OATT, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/in-
dus-act/oatt-reform/pro-forma-OATT.pdf?csrt= 17238740116495828819
[https://perma.cc/X3Q7-UHZ2] (last updated July 18, 2013).
47 Functional unbundling means that (1) the utility's generators must pay the
same rate for transmission as other generators, (2) the utility must set separate
rates for generation and transmission, and (3) the utility's generators cannot
receive insider information on the utility's transmission services. Order No. 888,
supra note 42, at 57.
48 Id. at 279, 283 (noting that "we wish to encourage the formation of prop-
erly-structured ISOs" and "[an ISO is an operator of a designated set of transmis-
sion facilities"). Generally, utilities that form an ISO still own and have fiduciary
interests in their respective transmission lines, but they allow the ISO to make all
decisions regarding the transmission lines' operation. Id. at 281. The operational
functions performed by ISOs include the "determination of appropriate system
expansions, transmission maintenance, administering transmission contracts,
operation of a settlements system, and operation of an energy auction." Id. at
284.
49 PJM is an RTO. Statistics at a Glance Fact Sheet, supra note 6.
50 Order No. 2000, supra note 26. One notable distinction between Order No.
888 and Order No. 2000 is the requirement that RTOs span multiple states. EISEN
ET AL., supra note 4, at 656.
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ing regional energy markets spanning the service areas of mul-
tiple utilities. 5 1 Generators and wholesale purchasers called
Load Serving Entities (LSEs)52 participate in these markets.53
In the typical energy market managed by an ISO or RTO, each
generator submits a bid stating what amount of energy it can
provide at what price, and each LSE submits a bid stating how
much energy it needs to satisfy consumer demand.5 4 ISOs and
RTOs then accept the lowest-cost combination of bids from
generators that can meet the LSEs' demands.5 5
ISOs and RTOs are subject to FERC oversight and must
submit tariffs5 6 describing the rules governing their transmis-
sion and market services.5 7 Using its FPA Section 205 author-
ity, FERC reviews tariff filings, issues orders approving or
approving in part tariffs that it finds to be just and reasonable,
and rejects or suspends the effectiveness of tariffs it finds un-
just and unreasonable.58 If an ISO or RTO seeks to modify its
tariff, it must again submit a filing describing its proposed
revisions to FERC, which FERC can similarly approve in whole
or part, reject, or suspend under Section 205.59 If FERC finds
that a tariff or tariff revisions are unjust and unreasonable, it
can further act under Section 206 of the FPA to initiate a pro-
ceeding to determine what changes would make the tariff just
and reasonable.6 0 If third parties-such as market partici-
51 EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 652; Order No. 888, supra note 42 (noting that
the ISO should schedule).
52 FERC defines load-serving entity as "[a]ny entity, including a load aggrega-
tor or power marketer, that serves end-users within a control area and has been
granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant to state or local law, regula-
tion, or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users located within the control
area." Load-Serving Entity (LSE), FERC GLOSSARY, https://www.ferc.gov/market-
assessments/guide/glossary.asp [https://perma.cc/KS28-MZLE] (last updated
Mar. 15, 2016). Essentially, LSEs are purchasers of energy In wholesale markets
that sell energy to end-use consumers. EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 652.
53 EISEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 652.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See supra note 45 for the definition of tariff
57 See Energy Policy 101, supra note 20; e.g., Transmission, Markets, and
Service Tariff ISO NEW ENGLAND, https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/rules-pro-
cedures/tariff [https://perma.cc/5VX3-LTSU].
58 See GREENFIELD, supra note 20, at 28, 34, 40.
59 Id.
60 E.g., Joseph W. Lowell et al., FERC Order on Subsidized Generation Could
Remake PJM Capacity Market, MORGAN LEWIS: POWER & PIPES BLOG (July 11, 2018),
https://www.morganlewis.com/blogs/powerandpipes/2018/07/fere-order-on-
subsidized-generation-could-remake-pjm-capacity-market/ [https://perma.cc/
7BWY-GRL81. Under Section 206 of the FPA, FERC can initiate a proceeding on
its own or in response to a complaint to ensure that rates are just and reasonable.
16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012).
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pants-believe an RTO's or ISO's tariff is unjust and unreason-
able, they can also file a complaint against an RTO or ISO
requesting that FERC modify the RTO or ISO's tariff under
Section 206.61 Third-party complaints often motivate ISOs and
RTOs to submit proposed tariff revisions, and FERC will fre-
quently consider the complaints together with the tariff revi-
sions when deciding what actions to take.62
FERC tasked ISOs and RTOs with maintaining the reliabil-
ity of their electricity grids and has demonstrated that it views
reliability, along with cost concerns, as relevant to whether
these entities' tariffs are just and reasonable.6 3 Through the
Energy Policy Act of 2005,64 Congress echoed FERC's concerns
about reliability by adding Section 215 to the FPA. 6 5 Section
215 gave FERC the authority to certify an electric reliability
organization to establish and enforce mandatory reliability
standards, subject to FERC review.6 6 FERC certified the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and has since
approved over 100 mandatory reliability standards developed
by NERC. 67
61 GREENFIELD, supra note 20, at 40.
62 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC T 61236, at *9
(June 29, 2018).
63 See Order No. 2000, supra note 26, at 21 (noting that "ISOs are significant
institutions to assure both electric system reliability and competitive generation
markets" and that "RTOs would improve grid reliability"); see also Order No. 888,
supra note 42, at 282 (stating that "ISOs should be responsible for ensuring that
services ... can be provided reliably"); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S.
Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016) ("To ensure reliable transmission of electricity from inde-
pendent generators to LSEs, FERC has charged nonprofit entities, called Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs),
with managing certain segments of the electricity grid."); PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., 117 FERC T 61331, 62652 (Dec. 22, 2006) (beginning a decision about a
RTO's tariff by stating, "As the energy needs of participants in competitive mar-
kets subject to our jurisdiction continue to grow, the Commission must ensure
just and reasonable rates by requiring that the energy supply continues to meet
these growing needs."). FERC also considers whether an ISO or RTO's rules
promote "efficiency in the marketplace." Order No. 888, supra note 42, at 283; cf.
Order No. 2000, supra note 26, at 1 ("The Commission's goal is to promote effi-
ciency in wholesale electricity markets . . .
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801-16538.
65 FERC, RELIABILITY PRIMER 5 (2016), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-re-
ports/2016/reliability-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N56-6C381.
66 16 U.S.C. § 824o.
67 FERC, supra note 65, at 6.
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B. Capacity Markets
To meet FERC's requirement that they ensure reliability,6 8
some ISOs and RTOs manage not only energy markets6 9 but
also capacity markets.70 Electric capacity is the amount of
electricity a resource can provide on-demand when the grid
needs extra energy to prevent consumers from losing power7 1
due to generator outages, demand spikes, or other forms of
system stress.72 A resource selling capacity is selling the com-
mitment to make a certain amount of power available for on-
demand use7 3 during a specified time period, usually a year
(the "commitment period").7 4
68 Capacity markets address the issue of resource adequacy, an important
part of reliability. CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, A CASE STUDY IN CAPACITY MARKET
DESIGN AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR ALBERTA 8 (2017), https://www.aeso.ca/assets/
Uploads/CRA-AESO-Capacity-Market-Design-Report-03302017-Pl.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P82U-8YPR]. Resource adequacy means that there is enough available
energy to satisfy demand at all times. Id.
69 Through energy markets, load serving entities (LSEs) buy energy wholesale
and resell that energy to consumers at retail prices. Adam James, Explainer: How
Capacity Markets Work, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (June 17, 2013), https://energy
news.us/2013/06/17/midwest/explainer-how-capacity-markets-work/ [https:/
/perma.cc/2QCG-5FRP].
70 See William W. Hogan, Electricity Market Design Energy and Capacity Mar-
kets and Resource Adequacy (Sept. 1, 2015), https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/
whogan/HoganEUCI_090115.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7N3-GCPVI.
71 Most U.S. electricity consumers expect to have power whenever they need
it, so power outages result in public outcry. E.g., Emily Alpert Reyes et al.,
Hundreds of Customers Are Still Without Power as Hot and Angry Angelenos Fune
at the DWP, L.A. TIMES (July 19, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/
lanow/la-me-dwp-power-out-20180709-story.html [https://perma.cc/AM96-
4FNR] (describing the anger of a homeowner who had to spend two nights in hotel
"worrying about the food and the frozen breast milk spoiling in her fridge" and a
storeowner who lost frozen and refrigerated inventory as a result of power
outages).
72 See, e.g., Connecticut DPUC v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(defining capacity not as "electricity itself' but as the "ability to produce it when
necessary"); Capacity Market (RPM), PJM, https://1earn.pjm.com/three-priori-
ties/buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets. a px [https://perma.cc/
SW7L-YDN2]; James, supra note 69. In a reliable system, there will usually be
idle capacity, but all capacity may be used during peak demand.
Other causes of power outages include wildlife, storms, tree limbs, vehicles,
and construction equipment damaging electrical equipment. What Causes Power
Outages?, WESTAR ENERGY, https://www.westarenergy.com/outage-causes
[https://perma.cc/WKT9-S8PDI; Mike Jacobs, 13 of the Largest Power Outages in
History-and What They Tell Us About the 2003 Northeast Blackout, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 8, 2013), https://blog.ucsusa.org/mike-jacobs/
2003-northeast-blackout-and- 13-of-the-largest-power-outages-in-history-199
[https://perma.cc/325R-9LZX].
73 This means that a generation resource will make sure it has generators
connected to the grid that are not in full use but can start operating when needed.
A generation resource may build additional generators or upgrade existing gener-
ators to expand how much capacity it can provide.
74 CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 68, at 13.
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An ISO or RTO operating a capacity market (hereinafter,
"the grid operator") forecasts what peak demand7 5 will be for
LSEs during a commitment period occurring a certain number
of months or years in the future.7 6 To ensure that LSEs have
enough capacity available to reliably provide electricity to their
customers during peak demand even if the grid experiences
unexpected stresses,77 the grid operator mandates that LSEs
meet capacity requirements. 7  An LSE's capacity requirement
reflects how much capacity would cover its forecasted peak
demand plus a "reserve margin," an extra amount of power
meant to ensure that enough energy is available during worst-
case conditions.79 In U.S. capacity markets, the reserve mar-
gin is calculated to prevent outages from occurring more than
0.1 days/year, based on the "one day in ten years" Loss of
(Firm) Load Expectation required in NERC's Reliability
Standards.80
The grid operator actively ensures that the LSEs in its mar-
ket meet their capacity requirements by securing capacity for
the LSEs through capacity auctions.8 1 This paragraph will ex-
plain how capacity auctions work, and the following paragraph
will provide a clarifying example. At the onset of each auction,
75 Peak demand is "the amount of power required to supply customers at
times when need is greatest." Peak Load, Peak Demand, ENERGY.GOV, https://
www.energy.gov/oe/activities/technology-development/energy-storage [https://
perma.cc/HGZ4-5D3W]. System operators account for expected load growth
(growth in energy demand) when calculating peak demand. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
MAINTAINING RELIABILITY IN THE MODERN POWER SYSTEM 7 (2016), https://www.en-
ergy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01 /f34/Maintaining/o2OReliability/o20n
%20the%2OModern%2OPower/o2OSystem.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W7B-KCZP].
76 This number of months or years is called the "forward period." James,
supra note 69. The forward period is generally long enough to allow generation
resources to invest in building new capacity (i.e., three years). Id.
77 I.e., generator outages.
78 SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETTION WORK IN ELECTRICITY (2002), http://regula-
tionbodyofknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/HuntMakingCompe-
titionWork.pdf [https://perma.ce/4AM8-FEGB].
79 The capacity requirement is calculated using the following formula: (fore-
casted peak demand) - (1 + X), where X is "a reserve margin, sufficient to meet
some preplanned level of reliability to cope with random generator outages and so
on that might otherwise cause customer outages if they occur at peak times."
HuNT, supra note 78, at 166. The reserve margin is usually between 15 and 20
percent of expected peak load. Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 ECON.
ENERGY & ENVTL. POLY 47, 49 (2013).
80 NERC, Planning Resource Adequacy Analysis, Assessment and Documenta-
tion, https://www.nerc.com/files/BAL-502-RFC-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BG99-CEP8]; CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 68.





the operator sets a "demand curve" that shows how much ca-
pacity the LSEs need and what the highest price is that the grid
operator would pay for that amount of capacity ("the price ceil-
ing").8 2 Much like in energy markets, generators then bid into
the auction, making offers specifying how much capacity they
can provide at what price.8 3 The grid operator then selects the
lowest-cost combination of generators that can satisfy the
LSEs' capacity requirements.8 4 The operator sets a clearing
price equal to the bid of the most expensive generator selected
("the marginal generator"), as long as this bid does not exceed
the price ceiling indicated on the demand curve.85
Consider an example in which the grid operator needs to
obtain 350 megawatts (MW) of capacity.8 6 If Generator A offers
100 MW at $50/MW, Generator B offers 50 MW at $10/MW,
Generator C offers 200 MW at $100/MW, and Generator D
offers 200 MW at $40/MW, the grid operator can obtain
enough capacity by accepting the bids of Generators A, B, and
D. It does not need to accept the more expensive bid of Genera-
tor C. Thus, the grid operator will set a clearing price equal to
Generator A's bid of $50-because Generator A is the marginal
generator-and will pay Generators A, B, and D each $50 and
Generator C nothing.
This example shows the dilemma generators face: they
want to extend high offers so that the grid operator sets a high
clearing price, but if they bid too high, they risk getting paid
nothing like Generator C. Typically, generators react to this
dilemma by bidding in at the lowest price at which they can
operate without incurring an economic loss.8 7 This price gen-
erally equals a generator's operating cost88-the amount of
82 This is a simplified description. Different capacity markets have different
types of curves, but the x-axis is always quantity (Q), and the y-axis is always
price (P). David Patton, Why Do Capacity Markets Exist?, POTOMAC ECON. (Oct. 4,
2017), https://www.potomaceconomics.com/capacity/why-do-capacity-mar-
kets-exist/ [https://perma.cc/AF6T-QUMQI. PJM has a Variable Resource Re-
quirement (VRR) curve. Id. This curve is horizontal at P = the Cost of New Entry
(CONE) from Q = 0 to Q = the capacity requirement. Id. This is because the grid
operator is not willing to pay more for existing resources to provide capacity than
the cost it would take to build a new generation resource that could provide
capacity (CONE). Id. The curve then slopes downward because once the grid
operator pays for the capacity needed to satisfy the LSEs' capacity requirements,
the grid operator is not willing to pay as much for additional capacity. Id.
83 James, supra note 69.
84 Id.
85 PJM, supra note 81.
86 The numbers in this example are not realistic but are used to provide a
simple example.




money it takes to keep the generator running and producing
energy, including labor, maintenance, and fuel costs.9 How-
ever, new generators that have not yet paid off their capital
investments generally bid in at a price including their capital
costs, which reflect how much money they spent building their
facilities.90
C. Price Suppression and FERC's Response: A Survey of
MOPRs
If new generators can offer prices below the capacity mar-
ket's previous clearing price, the system operator may no
longer need the previous marginal generator, resulting in a
drop in the clearing price. Consider the following example: if
two new generators, Generator X and Generator Y, respectively
offer 60 MW at $0/MW and 40 MW at $10/MW in the previ-
ously described capacity market, the clearing price would drop
because the system operator could use Generator X and Gener-
ator Y-instead of the more expensive Generator A-to fulfill
the 100 MW need. The marginal generator would now be Gen-
erator D, so the system operator would pay each generator on
the market $40/MW instead of $50/MW. This effect can occur
any time additional generators offer a significant amount of
capacity below the previous clearing price. Sometimes, new
generators can bid in at low rates not only because they have
low operating costs or capital expenditures but also because
they have sources of financial support outside of the capacity
market. When this happens and results in the clearing price
dropping, FERC says that "price suppression" has occurred.9 1
Energy generators with high operating costs such as coal com-
plain that price suppression prevents them from clearing ca-
pacity markets.9 2 Because they rely on revenue from capacity
markets, their failure to clear forces them out of business.9 3
89 Seth Blumsack, Basic Economics of Power Generation, Transmission and
Distribution, PA. ST. U., https://www.e-education.psu.edu/eme801/node/530
[https://perma.cc/6HDT-NPMY].
90 Id. Capital costs include regulatory costs, such as the costs of siting per-
mits and design to comply with environmental regulations. Id.
91 Robbie Orvis & Mike O'Boyle, It's Time to Refine How We Talk About Whole-
sale Markets, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.
com/articles/read/its-time-to-refine-how-we-talk-about-wholesale-markets
#gs.PxkCHqc [https://perma.cc/GS2W-74361.
92 E.g., Benjamin Storrow, Trump's "Affordable Clean Energy" Plan Won't






Low bids from renewables and natural gas have begun to
drive coal and nuclear power plants out of business in PJM.9 4
With FERC's approval, PJM has instituted a series of minimum
offer price rules (MOPRs) to try to make the clearing price
higher based on the assumption that price suppression causes
needed economic resources to leave the market, impairing reli-
ability.9 5 MOPRs force certain resources to bid at or above
certain price floors meant to reflect their true operating costs. 9
This subpart will (1) detail the evolution of PJM's MOPR and
FERC's role in its development and (2) tabulate how FERC has
justified all its decisions requiring or approving the creation of
MOPRs in capacity markets.9 7
On August 31, 2005, PJM filed a tariff under Section 205 of
the FPA proposing revisions to its capacity market structure,
arguing that its existing capacity market rules were unjust and
unreasonable, in violation of the FPA.98 In an order on April
20, 2006, FERC agreed with PJM that its "existing market rules
[we]re unjust and unreasonable, because they fail[ed] to set
prices adequate to ensure sufficient resources [to provide elec-
tricity reliably]."99 However, rather than approving PJM's pro-
posed revisions to its tariff (which did not include a MOPR),
FERC encouraged PJM to negotiate with its market partici-
pants to come up with a new, more comprehensive tariff propo-
sal.0 0 On December 22, 2006, FERC issued an order
approving the new tariff (the "2006 MOPR Order"), which in-
cluded a MOPR to mitigate "buyer-side market power."1 0
Buyer-side market power occurs when a buyer who is also a
seller (i.e., a LSE that also owns a small generator) seeks to
suppress prices by offering capacity at a rate below its genera-
94 See Lowell et al., supra note 60.
95 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC T 61331 (Dec. 22, 2006);
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. PJM Power Providers Grp. v. PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C, 135 FERC T 61022 (Apr. 12, 2011); Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., 163 FERC T 61236 (June 29, 2018).
96 See Lowell et al., supra note 60. There are limited exceptions in which
FERC will allow these resources to justify a lower offer price. Id.
97 See infra Table 1. This table also shows how FERC has justified key deci-
sions requiring or approving revisions to MOPRs.
98 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC T 61331, T 62653.
99 Id.
100 Id. T 62653. FERC stated that "many aspects of [the proposed tariff revi-
sions] need to be further analyzed and clarified before the Commission can rule on
this matter." Id. TT 62656-57.
101 Id. % 62659; N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. F.E.R.C., 744 F.3d 74, 85 (3d Cir.
2014).
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tor's operating cost.102 To address this issue, the tariff estab-
lished in the 2006 MOPR Order mandated that PJM impose a
MOPR on first-time offers from certain generator-owning
LSEs0 3 that buy more capacity than they sell.10 4 This MOPR
included important exemptions for sources built under state
mandates to enhance reliability 0 5 and certain resource
types.106 Significantly, at the time FERC found the state man-
date exception just and reasonable "because it enables states
to meet their responsibilities to ensure local reliability." 0 7 This
original MOPR was never triggered.o10
In 2011, a group of PJM generators claimed that the 2006
MOPR did not apply broadly enough to mitigate price suppres-
sion.109 In response, PJM again filed proposed tariff revisions
with FERC under Section 205 of the FPA.1"0 PJM proposed,
inter alia, replacing the MOPR's blanket state-mandate xemp-
tion with a rule that would have allowed states to apply for
exemptions for resources built under state mandates by pro-
viding the policy reasons behind their mandates.1 ' In an or-
102 Buyer-side market power is an issue because LSEs that produce their own
generation cannot simply use their own generation capacity to count towards
their capacity requirements without participating in the capacity market. N.J. Bd.
of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 85. Rather, they must bid into the market with their
generation capacity, making "self-supply offers," and purchase capacity from the
market. Id. Because these LSEs must buy capacity at whatever clearing price
PJM sets, they have an incentive to offer a low price for their generation capacity
so that they do not have to pay a high price for the capacity they need-particu-
larly if they need more capacity than what their own generator(s) provides. Id.
103 For the MOPR to apply to these offers, the offers also had to fail a conduct
screen and an impact screen. Id. at 85. An offer would fail the conduct screen if it
fell below a threshold price, and it would fail the impact screen if it would reduce
the clearing price by a certain value. Id.
104 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 86.
105 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC 91 61331, 9 62671 (explaining that
this exception "enables states to meet their responsibilities to ensure local
reliability").
106 These resources included base load, nuclear, coal and integrated gasifica-
tion combined cycle, facilities requiring a period of development exceeding three
years, hydroelectric power facilities upgrades, or additions to existing resources.
Nat. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 86.
107 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC 91 61331 ¶ 62671.
108 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 87.
109 Specifically, "an association of PJM's power providers, known as 'P3', filed
a complaint with FERC under § 206 of the FPA, arguing that the MOPR imple-
mented in the 2006 Order was not an effective tool for curbing buyer market
power." Id. at 88 (footnote omitted). P3 cited state reliability initiatives which it
thought the MOPR should apply to. Id.
110 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. PJM Power Providers Grp. v. PJM Intercon-
nection, L.L.C., 135 FERC 1 61022, 9 61087 (Apr. 12, 2011).
111 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 91 (noting that PJM proposed replacing
the state-mandate exemption with "a formal process for a state to justify its
initiative and thus obtain an exemption from the MOPR").
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der on April 12, 2011 (the "2011 MOPR Order"), FERC accepted
PJM's proposed revisions to its tariff but required several modi-
fications.112 FERC agreed with PJM that the 2006 MOPR's
state-mandate xemption should be eliminated "due to 'mount-
ing evidence of risk from what was previously only a theoretical
weakness in the MOPR rules,' namely, that state-subsidized
resources would suppress auction prices."'13 Using the same
reasoning, FERC rejected PJM's proposal to allow states to ap-
ply for MOPR exemptions."4 Thus, the 2011 MOPR Order es-
tablished a MOPR that applied broadly to new natural gas-fired
resources,1s including those receiving out-of-market support
such as state subsidies."6
In March 2016, a group of generators, including Calpine
Corporation (collectively, "Calpine"), filed a Section 206 com-
plaint against PJM (1) alleging that PJM's MOPR still did not
adequately mitigate price suppression and (2) proposing tariff
revisions that would do so.117 In its complaint, Calpine argued
that the MOPR established in the 2011 MOPR Order is unjust
and unreasonable because it does not address the price-sup-
pressive impacts of existing resources that can offer prices be-
low their operating costs due to state subsidies.11 " Calpine
focused on programs such as Illinois's zero-emissions credits
(ZECs) program, a program providing subsidies to existing nu-
clear plants that enable them to offer low enough prices to clear
the capacity market." 9 Calpine argued that because these and
112 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. PJM Power Providers Grp., 135 FERC T 61087.
113 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 91.
114 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. PJM Power Providers Grp., 135 FERC T 61106.
115 Id. ¶ 61107 ("We accept PJM's proposal to add wind and solar generation to
its list of generator types that are not required to offer into the base residual
auction at a price higher than zero.... We find persuasive PJM's justification for
applying the MOPR to CTs and CCs [(natural-gas fired resources)] and not the
exempted resources. CTs and CCs have the shortest development time to respond
to capacity needs and thus are more efficient resources to suppress capacity
prices.").
116 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC T 61236 (June 29,
2018). "PJM also incorporated several changes to the MOPR that P3 had not
suggested. First, it added wind and solar resources to the list of resources that
would always be exempt from the MOPR, and thus could offer their capacity at
prices as low as zero. As a result of those additions, the MOPR would only apply
to new gas-fired facilities." N.J. Bd. ofPub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 90.
117 Calpine Corp., 163 FERC [ 61236, at *9-10.
118 Id. at *4.
119 Id. at *5O, n.216 (citing Exelon Announces Outcome of 2021-2022 PJM
Capacity Auction, EXELON (May 24, 2018), http://www.exeloncorp.com/news-
room/exelon-announces-outcome-of-2021-2022-pjm-capacity-auction [https://
perma.cc/3T4R-PAP7] ("Quad Cities cleared the capacity auction as a result of




other subsidies allow "uneconomic" plants to clear the capacity
market that could otherwise not afford to, they have a price-
suppressive effect that results in unjust and unreasonable
rates.120
In response to Calpine's complaint, PJM made a Section
205 filing to revise its tariff, proposing two possible remedies to
the price suppression caused by state-subsidized resources.12 1
Based on the combined records of Calpine's complaint and
PJM's tariff filing,1 22 FERC concluded that, as Calpine had al-
leged, state subsidies to renewable resources "allow resources
to suppress capacity market clearing prices, rendering the rate
unjust and unreasonable."1 23 In a 2018 order, FERC found
that, unaffected by the 2011 MOPR, the state subsidy pro-
grams supporting nuclear, solar, and wind resources are caus-
ing "price distortions and cost shifts."1 24 FERC reasoned that
subsidies supporting these resources are significant enough to
make it possible for resources to clear the market that other-
wise could not, thus affecting the capacity market's clearing
price.12 5 According to FERC, certain renewables can bid into
the capacity market at zero because they can recoup their costs
from state payments alone.12 6 FERC argued that, by making
low offers and suppressing prices, these resources are some-
how able to displace resources "that can meet FERC's capacity
needs at a lower overall cost."' 2 7 Despite the ability of renew-
ables to clear the PJM's capacity markets, FERC asserted that
these are "resources the market does not regard as
economic."l28
120 Id.
121 PJM's preferred solution, known as Capacity Repricing, would have in-
cluded a two-stage annual auction, with capacity commitments determined in the
first stage and the clearing price set in the second stage. Alternatively, PJM
proposed MOPR-Ex, under which it would revise its MOPR to mitigate capacity
offers from new and existing resources, subject to certain exemptions. Adrienne
Thompson & Jasmine Hites, PJM Files Two Alternate Proposals to Address State-
Subsidized Resources in Capacity Markets, TROuTMAN SANDERS: WASH. ENERGY REP.
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.troutmansandersenergyreport.com/2018/04/pjm-
files-two-alterate-proposals-address-state-subsidized-resources-capacity-mar-
kets/ [https://perma.cc/7C5L-MUMN].
122 The Commission frequently consolidates the record in related proceedings
under FPA sections 205 and 206. See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC 1 61236, at *5,
n.9.
123 Id. at 63.
124 Id. at 64.
125 Id. at 65-66.
126 Id. at 66.




As a result, FERC found that the price-suppressive impact
of state-subsidized renewables differs little from the price-sup-
pressive impact of new natural-gas generation.12 9 Thus, FERC
concluded that limiting the MOPR to new natural-gas genera-
tion is unjust and unreasonable. o3 0 However, FERC decided
that neither the revisions proposed by Calpine nor the revisions
proposed by PJM could remedy this problem.13 1 Thus, FERC
initiated a FPA Section 206 proceeding to determine what
changes to the tariff it should require.13 2 FERC found that
PJM should expand the MOPR to include state-subsidized
renewables but give these resources a choice to opt-out of the
capacity market. '3
FERC's reasoning in its PJM MOPR orders echoed the rea-
soning it used to justify MOPRs in capacity markets managed
by other RTOs and ISOs, as seen below in Table 1.
TABLE 1. A COMPENDIUM OF MOPR ORDERS AND FERC's
JUSTIFICATIONS
OSO/RTO Date of FERC's FERC's Justification
the Order Requirement
PJM December FERC approved a The MOPR is "a reasonable
22, 2006 tariff including a method of assuring that net
limited MOPR buyers do not exercise
focused on LSEs monopsony35 power by
owning generators'3 4 seeking to lower prices
through self-supply. The
exception . . . for reliability
projects built under state
mandate ... is reasonable





129 Id. at 68.
130 ICL
131 Id. at 6.
132 1& at 7.
133 Id. at 69.
134 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61331, ¶ 62671 (Dec. 22, 2006).
135 Monopsony is another word for buyer-side market power. Julie Young,
Monopsony, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terrns/
m/monopsony.asp [https://perma.cc/KB8D-CCX2].
136 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61331, ¶ 62671. Note the
contradiction between the reasoning FERC used here and the reasoning it is now
using to target state-supported resources.
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NYISO March 7, FERC approved "The Commission finds that
2008 NYISO's proposals to NYISO's proposals improve
address market the mitigation that exists
power mitigation in today and are otherwise
the New York City just and reasonable
Installed Capacity because they... prevent
Market by net purchasers from
establishing artificially depressing
MOpRs"3 7  capacity prices with
uneconomic generation."
1 38
PJM April 12, FERC approved a "We continue to conclude
2011 tariff including a that the MOPR serves a
MOPR that applied to critical function to ensure
new, natural-gas that wholesale prices are
fired generation 1 3 9  just and reasonable and
should elicit new entry









ISO New April 13, FERC required ISO- A MOPR "would deter the
England 2011 NE to develop a exercise of buyer-side
Inc. ("ISO- MOPR based on market power and the
NE") benchmark prices for resulting suppression of
different types of capacity market prices
resources1 42  associated with uneconomic
entry" 
1 4 3
ISO-NE May 30, FERC approved a "[The renewables exemption
2014 MOPR exemption for should not have any
up to 200 MW of meaningful effect on energy
capacity provided market prices because the
qualifying renewable renewable entry is
resources1 4 4  occurring pursuant to state





137 N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 122 FERC a o 61211, 62191-92 (Mar. 7,
2008).
138 Id.
139 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. PJM Power Providers Grp. v. PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., 137 FERO 'I" 61145 (Nov. 17, 2011).
140 Id.
141 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. PJM Power Providers Grp. v. PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC ¶1 61022, ¶1 61106 (Apr. 12, 2011).
142 ISO New England, Inc. v. ISO New England Inc. PSEG Energy Res. & Trade
L.L.C., 135 FERC q[m 61029, au61169 (Apr. 13, 2011).
143 Id&
144 ISO New England Inc. & New England Power Pool Participants Comm., 147
FERC q[ 61173, ¶n 61983-84 (May 30, 2014).
145 Id. 61984.
249
ISO-NE March 9, FERC approved ISO- "We find that CASPR is a
2018 NE's proposal to just and reasonable means
phase out the to accommodate the entry
MOPR's exemption of new [state-subsidized
for renewable renewables] into the
resources' 4 6 and [market] over time... By
create a separate doing so, the [renewables]
capacity auctions for exemption is no longer
state-subsidized necessary to accommodate
resources to the entry of state sponsored
pin 4 7  resources." 
14 8
ANALYSIS
Subpart A argues that FERC lacked a sound policy justifi-
cation for its 2018 PJM MOPR order. As Part iC of this Note
explained, FERC has repeatedly cited price suppression as the
reason that markets need MOPRs but never established that
price suppression actually poses a problem. FERC's unex-
plained suggestions that price suppression pushes out eco-
nomic resources and impairs reliability are baseless.
Subpart B argues that FERC's order is arbitrary and capri-
cious, in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.
FERC's order violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
because (1) FERC gave an implausible explanation for its order
and (2) FERC failed to consider important aspects of the prob-
lem it faced. Specifically, FERC did not examine reasonable
alternatives or subsidies supporting traditional resources.
Subpart C argues that competitive markets do not require
regulatory intervention to accommodate higher volumes of
renewables.
A. FERC's Order is Theoretically Unsound.
As discussed in Part imC, FERC has repeatedly claimed that
price suppression is a problem, suggesting that it pushes "eco-
nomic resources" off the market and impairs reliability. FERo
attempted to designate state- subsidized renewables as "uneco-
nomic" and traditional resources as "economic,"'4 9 but this
distinction makes little sense and contradicts the judgment of
146 O New England Inc., 162 FERC a61205, at 99 (Mar. 9, 2018).
147 Id. at 2; Gavin Bade, Split FERC Approves ISO-E 2-Part Capacity Market
Plan, U sy Diov (Mar. 12. 2018), https://www.utlgtydive.com/news/splt-ferc-
approves-so-ne- 2-part-capacity-market- plan/ 518904/ [https: / /perma.cc/
WAH4-4B9M].
148 ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61205, at 10 1.
149 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC T 61236, at *50
(June 29, 2018).
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state legislatures. FERC relied on the assumption that the only
costs relevant to determining how economic a generation re-
source is are the costs the resource's operator incurs in pro-
ducing energy.15 0 However, truly efficient markets account for
not only the costs a producer incurs in producing a product
but also externalities-the costs third parties must pay be-
cause of a product's production.15 1 The state subsidies
targeted by FERC do not prop up uneconomic plants but in-
stead seek to make the energy market take externalities into
account.15 2 In particular, these state subsidies assign a mone-
tary value to the environmental costs avoided by the use of
renewables, particularly the climate change effects caused by
carbon dioxide emissions.15 3 Thus, the ability of state-subsi-
dized renewables to offer lower prices than traditional genera-
tors reflects the states' judgement that these generators have
lower overall costs. Further, as further discussed in subpart
II.B, state and federal subsidies affect the prices of all energy
resources, so FERC has no basis for singling out renewables
out as being "uneconomic" based upon their receipt of state
support. FERC should recognize that, in all competitive mar-
kets in the United States, government policies affect how "eco-
nomic" goods and services are and what products can compete
well, and the energy market is no different.15 4 FERC should
accept that the market is doing what it is designed to do-
pushing out uneconomic generators that cannot offer capacity
at competitive rates.
In addition, FERC's suggestion that price suppression
jeopardizes reliability is ungrounded. As discussed in subpart
I.B, NERC sets a Loss of Load Expectation standard requiring
that outages do not occur more than once every ten years, and,
150 See generally id. (characterizing renewables as uneconomic because of this
assumption).
151 See generally PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 437-38 (2d
ed. 2009) (examining what externalities are and how they can lead to inefficiencies
in the market economy); JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 136
(5th ed. 2016) (explaining how to account for externalities).
152 FERC should recognize that by design, these state subsidies "help increase
the overall economic efficiency of the market." SYLwIA BIALEK & BURCIN UNEL,
CAPACITY MARKETS & ExTERNALITIES 2 (2018), https://policyintegrity.org/ffiles/publi
cations/CapacityMarkets andExternalities-Report. pdf [https://perma.cc/
9ZWV-3TW7].
153 Zero-Emission Credits, NEI (Apr. 2018), https://www.nei.org/resources/
reports-briefs/zero-emission-credits [https://perma.cc/92WJ-WU76].
154 Cf 158 FERC T 61137 ("No other market in the United States is subject to
the same construct in which a federal agency reviews state action and imposes an




as part of their FERC-approved tariffs, RTOs and ISOs set a
reserve margin representative of how much extra capacity the
grid needs to meet NERC's standard. By definition, capacity
markets allow enough generators to clear to provide peak load
plus this reserve margin.15 5 Because of this, if FERC perceives
a need for increased reliability, FERC should either direct
NERC to modify its standard or require the grid operator to
increase its reserve margin. Further, in suggesting that tradi-
tional resources are more essential to reliability than renew-
ables, FERC did not consider that all generators clearing the
capacity market must have the ability to reliably provide energy
on an on-demand basis.'5 6
There is no evidence that price suppression has exposed
PJM's market to blackout or otherwise rendered the grid less
reliable. In fact, during PJM's most recent capacity auction,
PJM cleared enough capacity to meet peak demand plus a 22
percent reserve margin, a much higher reserve margin than the
15.8 percent reserve margin needed to meet NERC's Loss of
Load Expectation requirement.15 7 This means that PJM cur-
rently has far more, not less, capacity than NERC-with
FERC's approval-determined it needs to ensure reliability.' 5
Further, new natural gas plants have proliferated in spite of
price suppression, contrary to FERC's expressed concerns that
low prices will disincentive traditional generators from operat-
155 See supra subpart 1.B.
156 Brien J. Sheahan, When PJM's Capacity Market Stops Working for Consum-
ers, Is It Time to Leave?, UTILTY DIvE (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news /when-pjms-capacity-market-stops-working-for-consumers-is-it-time-to-
leave/538605/ [https://perma.cc/YS3U-VTSE] ("Capacity Performance Re-
sources must be capable of sustained, predictable operation that allows resource
to be available to provide energy and reserves throughout the Delivery Year"); U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 75 (explaining how renewables can provide energy on
an on-demand basis).
157 2021/2022 RPM Base Residential Auction Results, PJM 1, 4, 19 (2018),
http://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2021-
2022/2021-2022-base-residual-auction-report.ashx [ ttps://perma.cc/T45J-
4ACP]. E.g., Protest of Exelon Corp. at 14-15, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnec-
tion, L.L.C., No. EL16-49 (FERC, Jan. 30, 2017) ('The market is producing re-
source adequacy-achieving a reserve margin of 22 percent, exceeding its target
of 16.5 percent."); Id. at 5 ("Regarding investment in generation, PJM's Base
Residual Auction (BRA) provides ample capacity and has consistently exceeded its
target reserve margins."); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., No. ER18-1314-000
FERC), at 12 ("PJM has the most drastic capacity oversupply of any RTO in North
America.").
158 Richard Glick, Dissent on PJM Interconnection Capacity Market Proposals,
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ing.15 9 While coal plants have begun to leave the market, the
retirement of coal-fired power plants is due to the fact that
cheap natural gas has reduced the need for coal plants to re-
main on the grid to preserve reliability.16 0
B. FERC's Order is Legally Unsound Under the
Administrative Procedure Act
FERC's order violates the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) because (1) FERC's order demonstrates a clear error in
judgement and (2) FERC failed to consider important aspects of
the problem it faced because it did not examine reasonable
alternatives or subsidies supporting traditional resources. The
APA permits judicial review of final agency actions, including
FERC orders.16 1 The court uses an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard when evaluating FERC orders under the APA.1 6 2 If
159 A 2017 study noted that 15,000 MW of CCGG was under construction
(expected completion by 2019) in PJM's footprint, in spite of the low clearing price
of PJM's capacity auction. Bob Matyi, Gas-Fired Generation Buildout Not Over in
PJM: UBS, S&P GLOBAL POWER (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/
en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/020617-gas-fired-generation-
buildout-not-over-in-pjm-ubs [https://perma.cc/U26X-ADE6]; James Kennedy
& Eric Hsieh, Assessing the Economics ofNewbuild Gas Plants in the PJM Market,
31 ELECTRICIY J. 10 (2018), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S1040619018301076 [https://perma.cc/NW92-J576]; Robert Walton, UBS: PJM
Leads US Natural Gas Buildout, UTuTY DIvE (Feb. 8, 2017) https://
www.utilitydive.com/news/ubs-pjm-leads-us-natural-gas-buildout/435702/
[https://perma.cc/H6R4-HV5Y].
160 Peter Maloney, New Gas Build, Coal Retirements Could Make PJM Next
Market with Distressed Power Prices, UTILnY DIVE (Apr. 7, 2017), https://
www.utilitydive.com/news/new-gas-build-coal-retirements-could-make-pjm-
next-market-with-distressed/438962/ [https://perma.cc/QWC4-A2XZI; Bob
Matyi, supra note 159, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/
latest-news/electric-power/020617-gas-fired-generation-buildout-not-over-in-
pjm-ubs [https://perma.cc/Z6JQ-R8W6] ("Low-cost gas, Patterson said, 'has
been a substantial threat to many older incumbent merchant power facilities,
spurring lower-cost gas-fired generation which, in a low-demand growth environ-
ment, has been effectively displacing many older, less competitive power
plants.'"); Glick, supra note 158.
161 The APA notes that reviewable agency actions include "lalgency action
made reviewable by statute," inter alia. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). FERC Orders are
reviewable according to FPA Section 313(b), which allows "[any party . .. ag-
grieved by an order issues by the Commission . . . [to] obtain a review of such
order." 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (2012).
162 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); see also Am. Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 593 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (noting that the court "review[s]
[the Commission's] orders under the arbitrary and capricious standard and up-
hold[s] [the Commission's] factual findings if supported by substantial evidence").
Significantly, the landmark case Chevron only applies to an agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute it administers. This Note does not address whether FERC's
interpretation of "just and reasonable" is a permissible statutory construction-
rather, it is about whether FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, even assum-
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FERC makes an arbitrary or capricious decision, it has abused
its discretion, and its decision is invalid.
In evaluating whether an agency acted arbitrarily and ca-
priciously, a court should "consider whether the [agency's] de-
cision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment."6 3 In its
analysis, the court should "examin[e] the reasons for agency
decisions, or the absence of such reasons" to ensure the agency
"engaged in reasoned decisionmaking" in administering its
statute.16 The Supreme Court has elaborated that an agency
has not engaged in reasoned decision-making when it has "en-
tirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,"
making its action arbitrary and capricious.16 5 For example, in
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Iris. Co., the Court held that National Highway and Traffic
Safety Administration's (NHTSA) revocation of Standard 208,
which required automakers to include passive restraints in all
new cars, was arbitrary and capricious.16 6 The Court came to
this conclusion because the agency based its decision to revoke
the standard on the inefficacy of one kind of passive restraint,
removable seat belts, while "entirely fail[ing] to consider" air
bags, an alternate type of passive restraint the agency had
previously proposed.167 The State Farm Court also noted that
an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it "offer[s] an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper-
tise."16 8 In Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, the
court found that the agency gave an implausible explanation
and thus made an arbitrary and capricious decision. ' 6 9 The
agency had found that the best interests of the United States
justified an override of a stay of contract performance while the
ing that FERC's interpreted its statutory mandate correctly. Thus, it does not go
through the two-step Chevron process.
163 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
(internal citations omitted).
164 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011). In Judulang, the Court found a
clear error of judgment when the Bureau of Immigration Affairs (BIA) used an
approach that bore no relation "to the purposes of the immigration laws or the
appropriate operation of the immigration system." Id.
165 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,








Government Accountability Office (GAO) was making a decision
on the validity of the contract at issue.170 The agency reasoned
that a stay would divert agency resources because personnel
would have to "sit around waiting for the GAO decision, and
would be pulled from [ ] other tasks if their work associated
with the contract transition were rescheduled for the fu-
ture."171 The court found this explanation implausible in part
because an override of the stay would also divert agency re-
sources-agency personnel would have to spend their time per-
forming a contract that might turn out to be invalid.1 7 2 In
other words, the government's solution might actually worsen
the problem it claimed to solve.
1. FERC's Explanation for its Decision is Implausible
First, FERC's order is arbitrary and capricious because it
offers an implausible explanation for its decision. FERC claims
that it is trying to remediate unjust and unreasonable rates,
but its solution exacerbates that problem. FERC has shown
throughout its history of decisions that when energy providers
are charging more than they need to for energy, their rates are
not just and reasonable because of the harm to consumers. '7
As described in Part IA, FERC promoted competition for this
very reason; it sought to lower the prices consumers pay for
electricity. Even in its most recent MOPR order, FERC empha-
sized the importance of low costs, complaining about tradi-
tional resources "that can meet PJM's capacity needs at an
overall lower cost" leaving the market. 174 However, if these
traditional resources could actually meet capacity needs at a
"lower cost" in any relevant sense, they would be able to offer
lower prices than renewables without the help of MOPR. And if
FERC's concerns about costs were appropriately focused on
protecting consumers, FERC would not force consumers to pay
a higher price by requiring resources to bid in at a higher price
than necessary. As previously discussed in subpart II.A,
enough capacity will clear the market to meet reliability needs
no matter what; FERC's order simply makes consumers pay
more for no real reason. In effect, the order will cause consum-
ers to double-pay-for subsidies to renewables that will still
170 Id at 390.
171 Id at 388.
172 Id.
173 See supra subpart L.A.




provide capacity because of state mandates, and for extra, un-
needed capacity.175
2. FERC Failed to Consider Important Aspects of the
Problem
In addition, FERC "failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem" it faced-reasonable alternatives that do not
raise prices. 17 6 While FERC's order assumed that price sup-
pression makes rates unjust and unreasonable and requires
mitigation,177 price suppression is not inherently bad.178 As
discussed in Part II.A, FERC has offered no sound justification
for why it views price suppression as a problem. Because of
this, FERC should have, at the very least, considered alterna-
tives that would allow for price suppression instead of simply
trying to eradicate price suppression.1 7 9 Such alternatives
might include eliminating, rather than expanding, PJM's
MOPR, or only applying the MOPR to address market manipu-
lation by companies with market power.18 0
FERC also entirely failed to consider subsidies supporting
other energy resources. FERC described its order as targeting
175 Ann McCabe & John Moore, PJM's Capacity Market Proposal: Bad for Cus-
tomers, States, and the Fight Against Climate Change, UTILIY DIVE (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjms-capacity-market-proposal-bad-for-cus-
tomers-states-and-the-flght-ag/540723/ [https://perma.cc/33AM-PM831.
176 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
177 See supra subpart I.C (Price Suppression and FERC's Response: A Survey
of MOPRs).
178 See supra subpart L.A (FERC's Order is Theoretically Unsound). Price sup-
pression is often viewed as a "consumer benefit" because it lowers the rate con-
sumers pay for electricity (making the rate, arguably, more just and reasonable).
See, e.g., Renewable Energy Lowers Energy Costs for Consumers, PA. DEP'T OF
ENvrL. PROTECTION, http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Energy/Office%2000o/2OEnergy
%20and%2OTechnology/OETDPortalFiles/PA%2OEnergy/AEPS/Price%20Sup-
pression%20v.final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SRF-KPEA] (describing price sup-
pression as a "consumer benefit"); Frank Felder, Examining Electricity Price
Suppression Due to Renewable Resources and Other Grid Investments, 24 ELEC-
TRIcITY J. 34-46 (2011); Jennifer Chen, PJM Offers Two Proposals: A Rock and a
Hard Place, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.
nrdc.org/experts/jennifer-chen/pjm-offers-two-proposals-rock-and-hard-place
[https://perma.cc/A77X-P5GU].
179 The only alternative FERC considered was the "do-nothing" alternative of
continuing to apply the MOPR to new natural-gas fired generation (another
method of combating price suppression). See supra subpart I.C (Price Suppres-
sion and FERC's Response: A Survey of MOPRs).
180 I.e., returning to the initial MOPR that applied to LSEs owning generation.
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC q1 61331, T1 62671 (Dec. 22, 2006). While
FERC viewed this as a measure to combat price suppression, it was also meant to
address outright market manipulation by entities with buyer-side market power.
Id.
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the effects of state programs supporting "preferred generation
resources," which it refers to as "renewable resources . .. [now]
ranging from small solar and wind facilities to large nuclear
plants."1 FERC never explained why it views renewable re-
sources as preferred when state and federal governments have
long supported all types of energy resources, affecting their
offer prices. Multiple states, including those in PJM's territory,
offer subsidies and grants directly or indirectly supporting
coal-fired and natural-gas generation.18 2 For example, Illi-
nois's Coal Competitiveness Program provides grants to sup-
port coal production, preparation, and transportation
entities.18 3 Kentucky has a variety of programs subsidizing
coal, petroleum, and natural gas, including various tax incen-
tives,184 programs funding coal-mining training and education,
and a program providing grants for coal-related research and
development.18 5 Pennsylvania has given grants to both coal
and natural gas producers through its economic development
programs.'8 6 Indiana has programs providing tax credits for
181 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC 9l 61236, at *3
(June 29, 2018) (also listing as examples of subsidies the Renewable Portfolio
Standard and Zero Emissions Credits programs, while neglecting to mention any
programs not focused on compensating renewables for their environmental
attributes).
182 Coal Incentive Tax Credit, Ky. DEP'T OF REVENUE, https://revenue.ky.gov/
Business/Pages/Coal-IncentiveCredit. aspx [https://perma.ce/WP6Z-GRWQ]
(describing tax credits to entities operating coal-fired generation plants);
Database, Subsidies to Participants in PJM States, Based on Good Jobs First
Subsidy Database, EARTHTRACK, https://earthtrack.net/sites/default/ffles/up
loaded_files/20170605-item-02-subsidy-short-list-20170531.xls [https://
perma.cc/Y733-4WEHI (last downloaded May 3, 2017); see also Doug Koplow,
Subsidies to Suppliers in the PJM Interconnection Go to Fossil and Nuclear, Not Just
Renewables, EARTHTRACK (July 20, 2017), https://earthtrack.net/blog/subsidies-
suppliers-pjm-interconnection-go-fossil-and-nuclear-not-just-renewables
ihttps://perma.cc/578Q-Q2B8] (discussing these subsidies).
183 Coal Competitiveness Program, ILL. INST. FOR RURAL AFF., https://www.iira.
org/rdrg/coal-competitiveness-program/ [https://perma.cc/6MB5-2DYVI.
184 These incentives include the Thin Seam Tax Credit, the Sales Tax Incentive
for Alternative Fuel or Gasification Facilities, and the Sales Tax Exemption for
Energy and Energy Producing Fuels. Database, Subsidies to Participants in PJM
States, Based on Good Jobs First Subsidy Database, supra note 182.
185 Incentives supporting coal include the Railroad Improvement Tax Credit,
the Excess of Percentage over Cost Depletion, the Coal Used to Burn Solid Waste
tax credit, the Coal Used in the Manufacture of Electricity tax exemption, the Coal
Transportation Expense tax reduction, and the Coal Incentive Tax Credit. Id.
Incentives supporting petroleum and natural gas include the Sales Tax Exemp-
tion for Energy and Energy-Producing Fuels, the Special Fuels Tax Exemption for
Residential Heating, the Special Fuels Tax Exemption for Railroad Companies, the
Special Fuels Tax Exemption for Non-Highway Use, the Special Fuels Exemption
for Agricultural Use, and the Sales Tax Reduction for Jet Fuel, the Sales Tax
Exemption for Fuel Used in Farming. Id.
186 IL
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coal gasification and for the recycling of coal ash.'8s7 Virginia
provides tax credits for coal production.'8 8 West Virginia has a
tax credit for building coal loading facilities.'8 9 Ohio has sales
tax exemptions for natural gas sold from a municipal utility' 9 0
and items used in natural gas production. 19 Overall, $14.7
billion in federal subsidies and $5.8 billion in state-level incen-
tives support fossil fuels.19 2 Traditional energy resources re-
ceive seven times as much support from tax expenditures as












Renewable Energy Fossil Fuel
Like the subsidies to renewables on which FERC focuses,
these out-of-market payments to traditional resources are a
form of state support that make it possible for generation re-
sources to bid into the market at lower prices.19 4 If RTOs and
ISOs truly applied a MOPR to every resource receiving some
form of support from state or federal governments, they would
187 IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-29-19 (West 2019).
188 VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2 (West 2019).
189 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-23-17a (West 2019).
190 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.02(7) (West 2019).
191 Id. § 42(q).
192 JANET REDMAN, DIRTY ENERGY DOMINANCE: DEPENDENT ON DENIAL-HOW THE
U.S. Fossal FUEL INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON SUBSIDIES AND CLIMATE DENIAL 5 (2017),
http: //priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/ 10/OCIUS-Fossil-Fuel-Subs-
2015-16FinalOct2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZSQ-3X67].
193 Id. at 12.
194 Further, because these subsidies generally do not serve the role of ac-
counting for externalities, they are arguably more, not less, likely distortionary
than subsidies provided to renewables. Comments of the Institute for Policy
Integrity at New York University School of Law at 31, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Inter-




be forcing higher bids across the board. Yet, FERC's order
simply referred to subsidies as the types of programs compen-
sating resources for their environmental attributes.9 5 And
FERC did not point to any reasons why the subsidies it
targeted would have a different effect than the subsidies sup-
porting fossil fuels.19 6 These subsidies are critical for FERC to
consider because the existence of state subsidies for traditional
energy resources undermines the idea that renewables are dis-
torting the market or suppressing prices. By failing to mention
these subsidies-and hence treating similarly situated subsi-
dies differently without explanation-FERC acted arbitrarily
and capriciously.
C. Competitive Markets Can Accommodate Higher
Volumes of Renewables Without Regulatory
Interventions
By arguing that renewables would jeopardize capacity mar-
kets unless it established a MOPR, FERC was implicitly making
a much broader claim: that competitive markets cannot ac-
commodate high volumes of renewables. As discussed in Part
I, FERC's argument relied on the idea that renewables were
pushing "needed" and "economic" traditional generators out of
capacity markets. In effect, FERC was asserting that high
volumes of renewables pose a problem because if more renew-
ables clear the market, less traditional generators do. A MOPR
would address this by preventing many renewables from clear-
ing the market197-keeping the market share of renewables
small. By deciding that a MOPR was necessary, FERC took a
strong stance that competitive markets can accommodate
renewables only so long as it limits how many renewables suc-
ceed in the markets.
As discussed in subparts II.A and II.B, FERC's reasoning
was flawed. High volumes of renewables would not impair the
efficacy of capacity markets, so FERC had no need to intervene.
Rather, -FERC could have just allowed competitive forces to
decide which resources cleared the market. FERC's regulatory
interventions, it turns out, were both unnecessary and adverse
to clean energy goals.
195 See generally Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC
T1 61236 (June 29, 2018) (describing, for example, out-of-market payments as
programs such as the zero-emissions credits programs and the Renewable Portfo-
lio Standards programs).
196 J&
197 McCabe & Moore, supra note 175 (noting that "the consequence of the
MOPR is that the subsidized units often no longer clear in the auction").
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This suggests an interesting conclusion-that, in some
cases, competition may do a better job of allowing for the
growth of renewables than heavy-handed regulation. This calls
into question the ideas of academics such as William Boyd.
Boyd encourages a turn away from competitive markets, argu-
ing that more centralized planning is needed to integrate
renewables into the grid. 198 He envisions regulators with ex-
pansive authority as a solution to a "low-carbon future."199
Yet, FERC's usage of its regulatory authority over capacity mar-
kets shows that energy regulators do not always have clean
energy goals in mind. Sometimes, the problem is not the free
market, but FERC's intervention in it.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that FERC can and should ensure
reliability without requiring capacity market operators to im-
plement MOPRs inflating the prices of renewables-and the
prices ultimately paid by consumers. FERC can make sure
that enough resources clear capacity markets to avoid outages
simply by bolstering NERC's standards and the reserve mar-
gins of capacity markets. Because of this, high volumes of
renewables do not threaten the integrity of capacity markets.
Instead, they help ensure that consumers can access energy
during times of high demand at lower-indeed, more "Just and
reasonable"-rates.
198 See Boyd, supra note 16, at 1621-22 (claiming "that a broad notion of
public utility is essential to motivate and organize the planning and investment
needed to decarbonize the power sector by midcentury, to coordinate and admin-
ister a grid capable of integrating substantial amounts of intermittent renewable
generation and distributed energy resources, and to facilitate experimentation
and innovation at scale").
199 Id.
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